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Abstract
The status of women in China has deteriorated markedly since 2006 relative to other countries, according to the World
Economic Forum Gender Gap Index. Taking a longer view, the position of women has greatly improved since the founding
of the People’s Republic of China but, after the ‘opening up’ of the economy, the logic of the market and the legacy of
patriarchy have worked to the detriment of women. After briefly reviewing trends in China’s economic, demographic and
social development, this editorial follows the structure of the thematic issue in focusing on the processes which may have
caused women to slip behind. Socio-economic and political factors are considered first before focusing on the impact of
unprecedently large scale migration. The circumstances and experiences of women ‘left outside’ mainstream society are
explored next before reflecting on the lives of women left behind in poverty.
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1. Introduction
Whereas China ranked 63rd in world in 2006 in terms of
gender equality, by 2018 it had slipped to 103rd place ac-
cording to theWorld Economic ForumGender Gap Index.
This issue of Social Inclusion is a response to this appar-
ent decline in the relative status of women in China, the
intention being to better understand its significance and
the extent to which this reflects the lived experience of
modern Chinese women.
For many readers, China will be mostly understood
through the lenses of the Western media and Western
scholarship, lenses that inevitably bring a certain dis-
tortion to the image. The mainstream media are prone
to seeing China as something of a mystery, a waking
giant, being at once exotic, inscrutable, backward and
communist, a suppressor of human rights, the source
of SARS and now of Coronavirus (Covid-19). Increasingly,
too, China is presented as a threat toWestern hegemony:
as an economic competitor that does not play bywestern
rules, a political force that challenges western influence,
signing countries with the minimum of fuss and obliga-
tion into its growing sphere of influence through the Belt
and Road Initiative and, potentially, as a military rival, a
nuclear powerwith proven competence in space andmis-
sile technology and with the highest annual spending on
weaponry after the USA.
In terms of scholarship, China is often viewed as
different, the exception or the interesting case (Oya,
2019; Whyte, 2020; Wu & Wilkes, 2018), a position
sometimes similarly adopted by Chinese scholarship (Ho,
2014; Callahan, 2014). Arguably the oldest continuing
culture, uniquely imbuedwith Confucianism, Taoism and
Buddhism, it is frequently characterised as a society that
is held together by shame rather than by guilt (as in
Judeo-Christian cultures) and ruled through deference to
Social Inclusion, 2020, Volume 8, Issue 2, Pages X–X 1
leaders who are expected to be virtuous (Ho, Fu, & Ng,
2004). While Chinese schools recount sacrifices made by
patriotic ancient warriors whose heavily restored tombs
are centres of tourism, the humiliations of the nine-
teenth century at the hands of Western powers and
the brutal Japanese occupation in the 20th century are
nadirs againstwhich the Chinese Communist Partymarks
the national revival. But the New China, beginning in
1949with the founding of the People’s Republic of China,
is effectively two new Chinas: one Marxist-Leninist un-
der Mao Zedong, albeit with the peasantry rather than
the proletariat as the nominal revolutionary force; the
other, beginning in 1978 under Xiaoping Deng, a socialist
market economy with so-called ‘Chinese characteristics.’
Both phases of New China are typically perceived in op-
position to capitalism, individualism andwestern notions
of freedom. The excesses of the first period, the Great
Famine and the Cultural Revolution, are often contrasted
against the seldom questioned benefits of democracy,
while the achievements of the second period, the un-
precedented rate of economic and technological devel-
opment, the successful assault on poverty, mass migra-
tion and urbanisation are said by China’s critics to have
come at the price of universal state surveillance and lack
of individual freedoms.
In contrast to much of what has gone before, the
contributions to this issue do not view China from out-
side but from within. Moreover, many of the studies pre-
sented here begin with, or are reliant on, accounts of or-
dinary lives, using qualitativemethods to get close to the
lived experience of women in a range of circumstances
and situations. Consequently, we see much similarity be-
tween women in China and women elsewhere as they
seek to renegotiate their multiple roles in rapidly chang-
ing times. We see too: the strong influence of patriarchy;
the conflict between labour market expectations and so-
cial expectations as to who should nurture children and
care for the old; the impact of migration that breaks
bonds, offers freedoms but denies security and a sense
of place; the impact of modernity that requires the forg-
ing of new identities and which can exacerbate tensions
between generations; and the strength of traditional ex-
pectations that provide the continuity of culture,morphs
newness into old and imposes limits on what is possible.
2. Rapid Change
All these tensions and challenges are set against the
historically unprecedented rate of social and economic
change represented by the two phases of New China—
first, Marxist-Leninist, then, a socialist market economy.
Still largely feudal in 1949, the basic law implemented by
People’s Republic of China established that year stated:
The People’s Republic of China shall abolish the feudal
systemwhich holds women in bondage. Women shall
enjoy equal rights with men in political, economic,
cultural, educational and social life. Freedom of mar-
riage for men and women shall be put into effect.
(Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference,
1949, Article 6)
But the policies that followed were far from stable and
thus somewhat contradictory for women. Legislation en-
acting these principles in 1950 triggered high rates of di-
vorce that resulted within a few years in moves to regu-
late divorce and to promote family life. Likewise, when
women entered the labour market in large numbers and
the economy could no longer absorb them, they were
encouraged to stay at home. Then, with the Great Leap
Forward in 1958, they were commandeered to work in
the fields vacated by men who had been recruited into
new industrial ventures. And so, it remained,with female
labour participation at ‘saturation levels’ until the end
of the Cultural Revolution in 1975 and the so-called ‘re-
form and opening-up’ (gaige kaifang) of the economy
in 1978 (Li, 2000). But in that more open economy, fe-
male participation had fallen back to 73% by 1990 and by
2019 had dropped to 61%, albeit still much higher than
in either South Korea or Japan, countries that share a
Confucian heritage.
Since the founding of the New China in 1949, in-
come per capital GDP in real purchasing parity terms
has increased by a factor of 21 reflecting the transition
from a post-invasion, economically stagnant agricultural
society to a post-industrial economy accounting for al-
most a sixth of the world’s annual production and on
the cusp of being designated high income status by the
World Bank (Visualcapitalist, 2019). Most of this growth
occurred after the economic opening-up; whereas per
capita incomes merely doubled in real terms from 1949
to 1985, they have increased eight-fold since then. Thus,
the transition from theMaoist period tomarket socialism
brought with it profound economic and social change.
Labour was shifted from the public to the private sec-
tor with the ‘opening-up’ of the economy; the numbers
employed by state-owned enterprises more than halved
between 2002 and 2019 from 44% to less than 20%
(Guluzade, 2019). People migrated en masse from rural
China to the towns with the population living in cities
tripling from 20% in 1980 to virtually 60% in 2019. A high-
speed rail network of some 30,000 kilometres has been
built since 2008 and 28% of national energy needs are
nowmet from renewable sources. Poverty, based on the
US$1.90/day standard has been cut from about 40% in
2000 to almost nothing today, albeit in 2015, 377 mil-
lion were still living on less than $5.50/day, the World
Bank’s target threshold for highmiddle-income countries
like China (Walker, in press).
The population has almost tripled since the found-
ing of the New China in 1949 but, unlike economic
growth, much of the rise occurred during the Maoist pe-
riod. China’s population was 542 million in 1949 and had
grown to 900 million in 1968 when the birth-rate was
3.95/100. By 1980, almost coincident with the introduc-
tion of the uniquely authoritarian One Child Policy popu-
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lation control measures, the birth rate had already fallen
to 2.20/100 (United Nations, 2020). In 2019, four years
after the policy was abolished, with a rapidly aging pop-
ulation of 1.4 billion, the birth rate was only 1.14/100
with official revisions suggesting that it may be as low
as 1.05/100 (L. Zhang, 2020). The sex ratio at birth, cur-
rently about 115 boys are born for every 100 girls, is
the highest in the world, probably an unintended conse-
quence of population control measures and Confucian
notions of filial piety (Zhou, 2019). Men exceed women
by about 33 million which has profound implications for
relationship building and marriage and, given current
gender roles, society’s capacity to provide care for the el-
derly and for children (NBSC, 2019). 241 million Chinese
(17.3%) are aged over 60 and demographic projections
suggest that by 2050 nearly 35%will be aged over 65 (Chi,
2018; United Nations, 2020). Ignoring income forgone,
the estimated cost of rearing a child to the age of 17 is
273,200 yuan in the city and 143,400 yuan in rural areas
(Ma, 2020).Whilemigrating parents are increasing trying
to take their children with them to cities, almost 70 mil-
lion children are still left behind in villages to be looked
after by others, usually by their grandparents (Tong, Yan,
& Kawachi, 2019).
It is, therefore, in this context of colossal social and
economic change that the authors explore the status
of women in contemporary China. The implicit question
that they all, to a varying degree, address is to what
extent and in what ways have women benefitted from
these changes if, indeed, they have. Have they, as im-
plied by China’s decline in the World Economic Forum
Gender Gap Index, been left behind at least in relative
terms? While it was the findings of the 2018 World
Economic Forum report that provoked this thematic is-
sue, it is worth noting that China has fallen three more
places in the 2020 report and is now placed 106 out 153
(WEF, 2020).
In answering these questions, the twelve articles are
grouped into four sections each with amore refined take
on the question of being left behind: (1) left behind over-
all, (2) throughmigration, (3) outsidemainstream society
and (4) in poverty.
3. Women Left Behind?
The first two commissioned articles directly address the
question of whether women in China have been left be-
hind in economic, social and political terms over differ-
ent time periods. Chen and He (2020) dissect the Global
Gender Gap Report (GGGR) to determine the reasons for
China’s downward trajectory between 2006 and 2018.
The story is complex but while new countries have been
enrolled in the GGGR since it started, many with less gen-
der inequality than China, this was not the major reason.
Rather against the set of measures that constitute the
GGGR, the status of women has simply not improved as
quickly as it has inmany other countries including China’s
East Asian neighbours.
Chen and He (2020) argue that the choice of mea-
sures is important. The GGGR indexes the gender gap
with respect to economic participation, opportunity, ed-
ucational attainment, health and survival and politi-
cal empowerment. While the original 112 countries in-
cluded in the first GGR study in 2006 improved on three
of the four dimensions, the exception being health and
survival where equality had already been virtually at-
tained, the position of women in China appears to have
actually worsened on this dimension and not to have ad-
vanced as quickly on the others. However, the authors
point out that, since China’s imbalanced sex ratio at birth
is heavily weighted on the health index and affects the
gender balance, it is counted twice. This, they suggest, is
the main reason why China ranks much higher (39 out of
189) on the UNDP’s alternative Gender Inequality Index
which uses the maternal mortality ratio and the adoles-
cent birth rate to measure health inequality rather than
the sex ratio at birth.
While these criticisms are valid, such strong sex male
selection at birth must point to a profound undervalu-
ing of girl children and women in Chinese society. This
is even more notable given the strong ideological en-
dorsement of gender equality at the foundation of the
People’s Republic of China. Moreover, this commitment
is maintained in the rhetoric of the Chinese Communist
Party and the aspiration to increase the proportion of
women in the national and provincial bureaux is en-
shrined in election law. However, progress since 2006
is notable for its slowness in terms of representation in
political bureaux and is virtually non-existent at ministe-
rial level. Moreover, while the measures of political em-
powerment used in the GGGR have been criticised as eli-
tist (Lin, 2018), representation of women is even worse
at village level, where government most clearly inter-
sects with daily life, something Yang (2020) again notes
in her article.
The article by Yang (2020) complements that of Chen
and He (2020), taking a longer time perspective and
drawing on official statistics and survey data to provide
an analysis of women’s progress in the labour market
and in politics. What we find is a story of two halves.
Viewed from the perspective of 70 years, the progress to-
wards gender equality has been substantial but with the
arrival of a socialist market economy progress in many
respects has stalled. At the birth of the People’s Republic
of China, the government sought to distinguish itself by
ridding China of its ‘feudal’ legacy of which patriarchy
and the virtual subjugation of women were characteris-
tic elements. As Yang here describes, ‘during Mao’s era
women laboured shoulder-to-shoulder with men’ and,
though this often meant acting like men while also carry-
ing the burden of childrearing and housework, it brought
social and economic status. The films of the era, such
as Cui Wei’s, Mountain Flower (Shanhua), released in
1976 often present women as workers’ and village lead-
ers. Moreover, women’s incomes did rise significantly rel-
ative tomen’s reaching 79% in 1978 and 84% in 1988. But
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with marketisation, by 2014 this figure had fallen to back
to 66% in cities and 55% in the rural areas.
This fall in women’s incomes relative to those of
men occurred during a period in which rising educa-
tional attainment meant that the proportion of women
employed in high status jobs doubled. Yang (2020) at-
tributes this apparent contradiction to profit-seeking be-
haviour in the new era of a market economy. Because
of maternity and childcare responsibilities, women have
been seen as an expensive resource and have therefore
been more prone to being laid off in recessions and less
likely to be rewarded with promotion; women, the au-
thor concludes, are disadvantaged when resources are
scarce. Women were disproportionately affected by clo-
sure of state owned industries and by the state’s with-
drawal from the provision of childcare which both con-
tributed to the fall in female labour market participation
since marketisation noted above.
Moreover, the predominantly male voice of profit
from industry cannot be effectively answered by women
in government. This gives lie toMao’s rhetoric of women
holding up half the sky since, while the proportion of
women in government positions has increased four-fold
since 1978, this was from a very low base. As Chen
and He (2020) show, China lags most other countries in
women’s access to political power. Yang explains this in
terms of limited access to political positions and a reluc-
tance to take these up because women feel the need to
prioritise their “reproductive roles as dutiful wives” con-
cluding that “gender equality which is now seen to be
conditional on the premise of not harming the interests
of men” (Yang, 2020, p. X).
Zhong and Peng (2020), in the third article of
this opening section, show how the policies associated
with marketisation, notably the abandonment of collec-
tivist notions of childcare, have divided the interests
of women. Throughout the era of the socialist market
economy Chinese women have been expected to con-
tinue in their twin roles of worker and mother. For many
women this has proved to be impossible. For rural mi-
grants, it has long been accepted that it is grandmoth-
ers, and to a lesser extent, grandfathers back in the vil-
lages who have assumed the role of ‘mother,’ taking on
24-hour childcare for indefinite periods. However, the
authors demonstrate, through evidence from a qualita-
tive study conducted in Guangzhou, a city emblematic
of the market economy, that grandmothers similarly fa-
cilitate the careers of middle-class Chinese women in ur-
ban economies.With aweakening of the patrilineal tradi-
tion of intergenerational support in urban China, mater-
nal grandmothers are playing an increasingly important
role in the adult lives of their daughters as mothers.
The round-the-clock care provided by live-in grand-
mothers is cheap for parents compared to the cost of em-
ploying a nanny or buying private childcare; money sel-
dom changes hands although parents salve consciences
by giving presents and paying for holidays. Parents also
perceive grandparental care to be safer and more agree-
able despite frequent intergenerational disputes over
styles of childcare. But, Zhong and Peng (2020) argue, the
cost of mothers’ economic freedom is borne by grand-
mothers whose own personal needs are scarcely recog-
nised. Intriguingly, too, the authors argue that, while the
success of marketisation has been facilitated by the pre-
paredness of grandmothers to support employment of
their daughters and daughters-in-law, their reluctance to
continue in this role is likely to limit the success of the
current two-child policy.
4. Left behind through Migration
China’s economic growth since ‘opening-up’ has been un-
derpinned by the world’s largest ever rural–urban migra-
tion: 288 million rural migrants, 35% of them women,
comprise more than a third of the working population
(CLB, 2019). Such migration was probably never envis-
aged by Xiaoping Deng and the architects of economic
reform. Indeed, in the earlier era, the hukou registration
systemwas specifically introduced in 1958 to prevent mi-
gration to the towns for China’s continuing revolution
was to be led by the liberated peasantry. The legacy of
the hukou system is that it makes most migration nom-
inally temporary since migrants’ access to welfare sup-
port is restricted to their place of origin. Access to an ur-
ban hukou, available to a few migrants based on educa-
tion and employment status, is a highly prized asset.
The four articles in the second section emphasise
that migration, although frequently driven by economic
necessity, is often itself an expression of freedom and
can additionally liberatemigrants from the traditional be-
liefs and social structures that reproduce inequality in-
cluding those associated with gender. However, these
articles also demonstrate the power of culture and so-
cial norms to extend beyond geographic boundaries and
for patriarchy to continue to constrain the freedoms of
women. Particularly important is the persistence of the
‘feudal’ tradition of patrilocality, the wife moving to and
joining the husband’s family, a bride price being paid to
thewife’s parents byway of compensation. Fan and Chen
(2020) and Yang and Ren (2020) examine the motiva-
tions and consequences forwomen of internalmigration,
while the other two articles in this section draw attention
to internationalmigration. Tu and Xie (2020) focus on out
migration to theUKwhile Huang (2020) considers inward
migration from Vietnam.
It is frequently suggested that China’s rural-urbanmi-
gration has evolved in particular ways over time (Duan,
Lv, & Zou, 2013). Initially, it involved migration only the
during slack farming seasons, then more long-term mi-
gration with children being left behind, then families re-
uniting in cities, and finally migration being undertaken
by parents together with their children. A third of the
103 million children currently affected by migration live
with their parents in cities, the other two-thirds are left
behind (CLB, 2019). Fan and Chen (2020) both accept
and problematise this conceptualisation of the evolution
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of migration, showing, through the life experiences of
two women from Anhui province, that the sequencing
can apply structurally, to first and subsequent genera-
tions ofmigrants, but also occurwithin extended families.
Moreover, because families cope flexibly with changing
circumstances, the sequencing is not necessarily linear.
The two women that the authors follow, Yingyue and
Shaun, were born respectively in 1962 and 1992 and
represent two generations straddling China’s economic
opening-up. Yingyue was initially left behind looking af-
ter two children only migrating to the city when her own
daughter left school early. Somewhat resonating with
Zhong’s study, she now lives in another city caring for
her son’s two children, her husband having returned to
the village home to look after the family farm. Shaun,
brought up by her grandfather, left school early, and mi-
grated to join her parents, working in factories in Ningbo.
Introduced to a man in her home village, Shaun mar-
ried at 20 returning with her husband to Ningbo and his
parents. She briefly went back to her home village to
give birth and then returned to Ningbo providing domes-
tic labour for her in-laws. Having a second child, Shaun
moved back in her home village where, albeit longing
to return to work, she cares for the children while her
husband is away working in a family courier firm. In both
cases, migration added to living standards but did not lib-
erate the women from their first obligation, to care for
their husbands, children and in-laws.
The in-depth accounts of the experiences of these
two women are echoed in the lives of the 124 female
villagers in Maple Village in Shanxi province studied by
Yang and Ren (2020), 96 of whom had undertaken mi-
grant work. These migrant women also find themselves
ultimately confined by patriarchy and often by patrilo-
cality, although their migration initially shifts power rela-
tions, first within the matrimonial home and then, more
permanently, between generations. Outside the home,
however, where womenmight want to exploit their skills
acquired from migration, for example by participating in
village governance, they encounter great external resis-
tance often in the form of overt male prejudice. This per-
haps helps to explain the underrepresentation of women
in government noted by Yang (2020).
Most of the women in Maple village had left the vil-
lage immediately after finishing school. In the city, they
found work hard, often feeling exploited, but they en-
joyed hitherto unknown freedoms, not least the oppor-
tunity to choose a husband. On marriage, usually with
both spouses working in the city, the woman not infre-
quently earning more than the man, domestic chores
were often shared. Moreover, parents found that their
sons and daughters-in-law were contributing more than
they were to the overall income of the extended family
which meant collective decisions favoured the young or,
at least, promoted their earning power. With one child,
it was often decided that, after a short spell in the vil-
lage, the woman would re-join their husband in the city.
A second child tended to make this option look less at-
tractive but, caring for children back in the husband’s vil-
lage and unsupported as a ‘foreigner’ by the community,
they rapidly lost their autonomy reverting to the role of
dutiful daughter-in-law.
From Tu and Xie’s (2020) article, it seems that even
migration abroad, specifically to the UK in the case of
their study, does not free women from the traditional
values. Without siblings, daughters of middle-class par-
ents are expected to perform as sons, advancing the sta-
tus of the family through education and economic suc-
cess, while also behaving as good daughters. Parents be-
lieve that having their daughter study abroad is an invest-
ment in the family, exchanging economic for social capi-
tal. However, in so doing parents seem to recognise that
they are also taking a risk. If their daughter is too high
an achiever, this may reduce the chance of her finding
a ‘suitable’ husband, since Chinese men expect to marry
beneath themselves, and becoming a good wife means
supporting the husband’s career rather than their own.
Whilemothers perhaps seemedmore supportive of their
daughters chosen career paths than fathers, they too
held to the notion that it was a goodmarriage that made
a Chinesewoman “truly successful.” From the three case-
studies presented by Tu and Xie (2020), it seems that
daughters can do little to resist their families’ expecta-
tions, “pulled back” by parents “left behind” in China.
A Chinese marriage was also the aspiration of many
of the female Vietnamese migrants that Huang (2020)
studied in the Sino-Vietnamese borderlands defined by
the Nanning/the Friendship Port/Hanoi economic corri-
dor. While the desire to escape rural poverty is the un-
derlyingmotivation to enter the borderlands, where two
cultures coalesce around the goal of economic develop-
ment, the migrant’s motives are complex. Not so much
running away, as going somewhere, Vietnamese women
migrants aspire to a better life, to be enterprising and
adventurous and modern. Leaving the village, they also
leave pressures to marry young and become a man’s
chattel, they can choose their ownmarriage partner and
a Chinese marriage perceived to be more egalitarian
than in rural Vietnam. Although many rotate between
village and town, these women appear, without restric-
tions equivalent to hukou, to be less bound by place. But
while wages for equivalent work are higher in China than
Vietnam, their limited education and gender make them
vulnerable to economic and sexual exploitation and, as
female migrants, to stigma and innuendo both in the
borderlands and back in their villages. A Chinese hus-
band becomes a legitimation and a defence, symbolic of
success and, ironically when set against the life experi-
ences of women migrants in China, a manifestation of
personal freedom.
5. Left Outside Mainstream Society
The three articles that concern women who find them-
selves to be on the edges of modern Chinese society are
connected by the theme of intersectionality.
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In their article, Wang and Liu (2020) introduce Lydia
who, although becoming an outsider, is the embodi-
ment of, and perhaps a metaphor for, China’s economic
opening-up. A successful voice performance student,
Lydia lost her virginity on her first date with a motorbike-
riding “prince,” nine years older than herself. His mother,
rich as the chair of a state-owned enterprise and own-
ing an associated private company, doted on her son,
buying him a karaoke club on Lydia’s whim. Without
entrepreneurial talent or knowledge of the commer-
cial sex industry, Lydia and her boyfriend enjoyed the
club’s profitability with heroin use being demonstrative
of their wealth and success, and multiple abortions easy
to pay for. Everything changedwhen first, her boyfriend’s
mother was jailed for corruption and secondly, he was
imprisoned for sheltering prostitution and carrying a
gun. Heroin addiction put her in frequent contact with
police, repeated courses of drug-rehabilitation failed, a
baby was born and died of neglect, and Lydia contracted
HIV/AIDS, a shock that seemed to “save her,” allowing
her to begin a new life benefiting from China’s new treat-
ment system, the ‘Four Frees and One Care.’
Lydia, then, was caught in the maelstrom of marketi-
sation, freed from convention and family to play roles
as lover, entrepreneur and extravagant consumer, she
lacked a social or moral compass and could not escape
becoming a victim of a patriarchal society that legiti-
mates male exploitation of women. Taking Lydia’s experi-
ence as ametaphor for China’s socialist market economy,
it is notable that she was “saved” by state intervention.
China’s sex industry is also the context for Ding’s
(2020) article inwhich she argues thatwomen should not
be reduced to the label ‘sex-worker,’ preferring the term
xiaojie. In ancient China, xiaojiewas the polite formof ad-
dress for unmarried daughters of rich families and has be-
come associatedwith prostitution only in the last decade.
It is the term that Ding found was preferred by women
engaged in the sex industry in the economically success-
ful Pearl River Delta area of southern China. The author
likens what xiaoxies do to the self-employment, infor-
mal employment and temporary employment that has
increasingly replaced formalwork in the public (gongzuo)
and private (dagong) sectors. Xiaojies, as second or third
generation migrants, generally unskilled, poor and stig-
matised, seek to avoid the exploitation that they be-
lieve factory work to be, and to identify themselves
with their portfolio of roles: singer, dancer, girlfriend,
confidant, networker, businesswoman and chulai. The
term chulai, literally meaning to ‘come out,’ seems to
connect to the experience of the migrant women in
the Sino-Vietnamese borderlands: rural woman surviv-
ing and seeking to prosper in the modern city.
In the third article in this section, Pei, Zheng, and
Gao (2020) explore the intersection of gender and dis-
ability, or more strictly of patriarchy and ableism, and
the potential of the internet to enhance social capital
and earning power. While the five cases discussed can-
notmeaningfully represent the approximately 8.5million
disabled women of working age in China, most of whom
have not completed a full school curriculum, they do il-
lustrate the power of social media to engage. With assis-
tive technology, the internet has the capacity to limit the
impact of physical, mobility and sensory disabilities, the
five respondents all being able to generate meaningful
amounts of income as salespeople and through stream-
ing activities. Pointedly, though, most use the internet
to hide their disability rather than to challenge preju-
dice, in part because they have been harassed on-line
and accused of being “internet beggars.” While China as-
pires to promote “high-quality development of employ-
ment for disabled people in the new era,” much clearly
needs to be done the change public attitudes and wel-
come disabled people into mainstream society (Xinhua
News, 2019).
6. Left Behind in Poverty
China is politically committed to eradicating extreme, ru-
ral poverty in 2020, the outcome of a concerted cam-
paign pursued particularly rigorously under the personal
leadership of Chairman Xi, Jinping since 2015. Currently
it is thought that the 14th Five Year Planwill acknowledge
the existence of urban poverty for the first time and in-
troduce a measure of relative poverty. In many respects,
though, as Li (2020) notes in her article on lone parent-
hood, poverty alleviation policy is gender blind.
With the population and family planning law impos-
ing fines onwomenwho give birth out of wedlock (called
‘social support expenditure’), most lone or single moth-
ers, of whom there are 20 million in China, are divorcees
or widows. This was also true of the author’s sample
of 42 women studied in Zhuhai in the Pearl River Delta.
Single mothers are particularly prone to poverty due to
China’s patriarchal norms and the government’s empha-
sis on familial rather than collective support. The author
found that financial hardship was acute in her sample,
women’s careers were truncated, stress-related physi-
cal and mental health disorders were prevalent, and so-
cial relationships and social capital were severely con-
strained. As daughters, their education had been less pri-
oritised by their parents while, as mothers, they were ex-
pected to prioritise childcare above career. This meant
that, combined with gender inequalities in the labour
market and only expensive childcare being available,
their earning power was extremely limited. As divorcees,
lone mothers could be considered as failed wives, disap-
pointing their parents and rejected by in-laws, they felt
required to make amends by devoting their lives to child-
rearing. They had little time to socialise and to find a
prospective partner and, in addition, their prospects for
re-marriage were low as, with children, they presented a
double liability. Li (2020) argues persuasively for policies
that recognise the negative impact of China’s familistic
culture and its negative impact on lone mothers.
The final article by G. Zhang (2020) is especially ap-
posite in that, while Li (2020) discusses poverty result-
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ing from the loss of a husband, he explores marriage mi-
gration as a strategy by which women escape poverty.
Transactional marriage, in which a bride is effectively
sold to relieve the poverty of her natal family, was preva-
lent in China in the 1980s and in earlier eras and possibly
still exists. However, the author uses the term ‘marriage
migrant’ (waidi xifu) to describe an outcome matching
the aspirations of the Vietnamese migrants observed by
Huang (2020). Young women migrate for work, find hus-
bands and stay with them in more prosperous regions of
China. This change from a collective familial to an indi-
vidual response to poverty might be seen as an aspect
of modernity, the personal ‘I’ taking precedence over
the family ‘we,’ with the natal family gaining little save
a mouth less to feed. However, it also reflects traditional
values of patrilocality and the wife’s expected allegiance
to her in-laws.
What the author concludes is that, while marriage
migrants may escape absolute poverty, they rarely es-
cape relative poverty, the stigma of being a migrant be-
ing enough to deny them the chance of marrying an eco-
nomically successful local. Instead, the best that they can
hope for is to have a son who is able to marry well as a
result of the hard work and sacrifice of his mother and
father. Moreover, despite trying to socially integrate and
to be accepted, the women that the author interviewed
were seldom able to overcome the shame of once being
a poor migrant looking for a husband. If not left behind,
socially they are put aside.
7. Conclusion
The articles in this issue confirm that the status of
women was much enhanced following the founding of
the Peoples’ Republic of China but that since the opening-
up of the economy, the logic of the market has worked
against women. Profit maximisation does not value non-
marketable work and the transfer of child and social care
back from state to family has increased the burden on
women. While it can be debated whether the indicators
used in the World Economic Forum Gender Gap Index
discriminate against China, and thereby understate the
status of women in China, women are undeniably mas-
sively underrepresented in senior positions in business
and throughout government. Without access to the po-
litical decisions that matter, women will continue to be
left behind and left outside in China.
In reading and interpreting Chinese scholarship,
it is helpful to note some conventions. Much schol-
arship is normative, interpreting the world from a
Marxist-Leninist perspective and increasingly through
the thoughts of ChairmanXi Jinping. Empiricalwork, such
as that represented by articles in this issue, is compara-
tively rare. Chinese culture is to believe that China is the
first among equals or, indeed, that China is a model that
it is for others to follow. Direct criticism of academicwork
is unusual; this is to avoid inflicting loss of face and expe-
riencing it by return. Direct criticism of government pol-
icy is even more unusual; academics are expected to be
moral and to believe what is politically correct. Critique
of policy implementation can be acceptable if it is di-
rected towards lower levels in the administrative hierar-
chy. If critique is sometimes acceptable, being overtly po-
litical never is. Finally, it is an essential interpretive skill to
seek and find meaning from the words that are missing.
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